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In 1852, the governing officials of Ōno, a small 
domain of 40,000 koku in Echizen province, settled 
the problem of who would serve as executioners and 
who would supply auxiliary labor for the execution 
site. Both jobs ended up being entrusted to a group 
of local outcastes. Although it was common for out-
castes during the Tokugawa period to be mobilized 
for executions and other penal tasks, the actual sev-
ering of the head (in the case of beheadings) was 
often assigned to low-ranking samurai or rōnin em-
ployed on a temporary basis.2 In Ōno, too, until 
1852 executions had been carried out by the jail 
guard, or rōban, a hired commoner who was given 
samurai status for the duration of his tenure.3 The 
                                                  
1 The author wishes to thank Daniel Botsman, 
David Howell, Amy Stanley, Steve Wills, Colin 
Jaundrill, and three anonymous reviewers for their 
comments and is grateful to the Japan Foundation 
and the Office for the Compilation of Ōno City His-
tory (Ōno-shi Shi Hensanshitsu) for their generous 
assistance. This paper is based on research conduc-
ted in the context of a dissertation project on poor 
relief and local society during the late Tokugawa 
period. 
2 Daniel V. Botsman, Punishment and Power in 
the Making of Modern Japan (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 50-58; Tsu-
kada Takashi, “Kinsei no keibatsu,” in Saiban to ki-
han, ed. Yamaguchi Keiji (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
1987), pp. 116-128; Itō Takao, “Shikei no shakai-
shi: Kinsei-Kindai Nihon to Ōbei,” in Higashi Ajia 
no shikei, ed. Tomiya Itaru (Kyoto: Kyōto Daigaku 
Gakujutsu Shuppankai, 2008), pp. 257-297; Petra 
Schmidt, Capital Punishment in Japan (Leiden & 
Boston: Brill, 2002), pp. 9-19. 
3 The jail guard received a stipend (kirimai) of 
ten bales of rice and rations for two (nininguchi) per 
year, and was placed under the command of the 
town magis-trate (machibugyō). See the town 
magistrate’s precedent manual “Tsutomekata obo-
egaki Tamura-hikae,” Tamura Kōsaburō-ke monjo 
i153 176, 1810, precedents for the fifth and twelfth 
months; and “Ōno-han bugenchō,” 1770s, Ōno-shi 
recruitment of outcastes for this position was not an 
inevitable outcome. 
This discussion of executioners in Ōno focuses 
on the following three issues. First, why did the 
domain decide to change the traditional arrangement 
and begin to rely on outcaste executioners instead of 
the jail guard? Second, how did the domain per-
suade the outcastes to take on such an unpleasant 
and stigmatizing but, in the eyes of the administra-
tion, necessary task? And finally, what does the do-
main’s solution to the problem tell us about the na-
ture of the status order in the Bakumatsu period, 4 a 
time when this system is commonly perceived to 
have been rigid and outdated?  
As research of the past two decades has shown, 
the Tokugawa status order was not a strictly hierar-
chical construction that neatly divided the popula-
tion up into stable categories. Early modern Japan 
was filled with localized groups that competed for 
privileges and were constantly negotiating their so-
cial position both with the government and with 
each other.5 As the case of the Ōno executioners 
                                                                             
rekishi minzoku shiryōkan monjo 2, in Fukui-ken shi, 
Shiryō-hen 7, Chū/kinsei 5 (Fukui: Fukui-ken, 
1992), pp. 81-100. For cases of jail guards marrying 
townswomen see “Machidoshiyori goyōdome,” 
1852 6/6+8/21, Saitō Suzuko-ke monjo i030 063, pp. 
97, 120. Copies of the journals (machidoshiyori 
goyōdome) of the town elders of Ōno constitute the 
main source of this paper and are accessible in the 
Office for the Compilation of Ōno City History. 
4 This paper locates the onset of the Bakumatsu 
era in the early 1840s, i.e. the time of the First 
Opium War, the Tenpō Reforms of the Shogunate, 
and the beginning of Ōno’s own reform efforts. 
5 See, for example, David Howell, Geographies 
of Identity in Nineteenth-Century Japan (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005); Herman 
Ooms, Tokugawa Village Practice: Class, Status, 
Power, Law (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1996). Recent studies of biographies and 
networks of intellectuals also call for a less rigid 
understanding of the status order; Anna Beerens, 
Friends, Acquaintances, Pupils and Patrons. 
Japanese Intellectual Life in the Late Eighteenth 
Century: A Prosopographical Approach (Leiden: 
Leiden University Press, 2006); Bettina Gramlich-
Oka and Gregory Smits (eds.), Economic Thought 
in Early Modern Japan (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2010). 
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demonstrates, even the social roles of outcastes 
were defined only loosely and could undergo sig-
nificant changes over time. Although the authorities 
were prevented by precedent from assigning new 
duties to their subjects at will, they could persuade 
status groups to cooperate by granting them privi-
leges, while the groups themselves sometimes of-
fered to undertake new duties to the government in 
order to obtain new rights. In this paper, I empha-
size the flexibility of the status system, and its reli-
ance on a set of rules that were easily bent but not 
easily broken. 
Before entering into the details of the execu-
tioner case, I will provide some further background 
on two issues that will help situate the incident in its 
larger context: first, on the reforms in Ōno domain 
during the final decades of Tokugawa rule, and sec-
ond, on the general topic of mobilization by status. 
 
Reform in Ōno Domain 
 
The year 1852 falls into what is usually consid-
ered as a part or at least the eve of the Bakumatsu 
era, and we have grown accustomed to seeing these 
decades as a time when many domains, including 
Ōno, engaged in reforms that challenged old hierar-
chies and institutions. In 1842, Ōno’s Lord Doi To-
shitada formally announced his intention to embark 
on an ambitious reform program, following up on 
earlier reform attempts in the 1830s.6 The initial 
goal was the restoration of domain finances, which 
was achieved through a combination of austerity, 
promotion of domestic products, and the establish-
ment of a domain-run trading company (Ōnoya, 
1855) with branches in places such as Osaka, Hako-
date, and Yokohama.7 In addition, Toshitada and his 
vassals placed great emphasis on the introduction of 
Western technical knowledge. They established a 
domain academy (1843) and an institute for Western 
learning (Yōgakukan, 1856), whose scholars had 
close ties with the Tekijuku academy in Osaka and 
translated and published a number of foreign books 
on language acquisition, military technology, and 
                                                  
6 Fukui-ken shi, Tsūshi-hen 4, Kinsei 2 (Fukui-
ken, 1996), pp. 635f., 718-726, 813-860. 
7  Sakata Tamako, “Hanten ‘Ōnoya’ no ken-
kyū,” Okuetsu shiryō 6 (1977), pp. 1-105. 
maritime navigation.8 The domain government also 
promoted medical innovations such as smallpox 
vaccinations (1850) and a hospital for the domain 
population (1859).9 Moreover, Ōno was one of the 
first domains in the Hokuriku region to experiment 
with Western weaponry (1845). It even secured 
permission from the Shogunate to start a colonial 
project on the southern end of the island Karafuto 
(Kita-Ezochi, 1859), and purchased a Western-style 
schooner (1858) to travel to its colony and ship 
trade goods to Hakodate.10   
Many of these reforms called traditional social 
distinctions into question. Samurai became directly 
involved in the management of a commercial enter-
prise; low-ranking vassals were promoted to high 
office; the new domain academy opened its doors to 
gifted students from non-warrior backgrounds; and 
children of outcastes received the same smallpox 
vaccinations as commoner children.11 Still, as far as 
the important issue of punishment and public order 
was concerned, the officials of Ōno domain chose 
solutions that carefully observed the conventions of 
the status order. On the one hand, this behavior 
serves as a reminder of the constraints that status 
imposed on domainal reforms. But at the same time 
it shows that while domain reformers might have 
ignored the status order in certain respects, they did 
not hesitate to actively rely on it in others.  
Ōno’s search for an executioner was related to 
the context of domain reform. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, and particularly during the Tenpō famine 
(1834-38), public safety in the interior of Echizen 
province had deteriorated considerably. The number 
of recorded burglaries reached an unprecedented 
                                                  
8 See, for example, Iwaji Yūichi, Ōno-han no 
yōgaku (Ōno, 1984). 
9 Ōno-shi Shi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Ōno-shi shi, 
vol. 9, Yōdome-hen (Ōno: Ōno Shiyakusho, 1995), 
no. 1125, pp. 808f.; “Shutō shōrei ni tsuki fure-
gaki,” “Saisei byōin kaisetsu ni tsuki tasshi,” Yasu-
kawa Yozaemon-ke monjo 4+5, in Fukui-ken shi, 
Shiryō-hen 7, Chū/kinsei 5 (Fukui: Fukui-ken, 
1992), pp. 458-461; Iwaji Yūichi, “Ōno-han shutō 
denrai no monjo,” Okuetsu shiryō 13 (1984), pp. 15-
22. 
10 Fukui-ken shi, Tsūshi-hen 4, Kinsei 2, pp. 
825-833, 841-860. 
11 On outcaste vaccinations, see Ōno-shi shi, 
Yōdome-hen, no. 1204, p. 862. 
EARLY MODERN JAPAN                                2010 
 
78 
level, and there were a fair number of professional 
gamblers and thieves permanently entrenched in the 
area.12 If the government wanted to enrich its terri-
tory and avoid attracting criminals from domains 
with stricter law enforcement, it could not afford to 
let the matter rest. Moreover, like most reforms, 
Ōno’s domain reforms produced their share of dis-
contents, and the death penalty could only serve its 
purpose of intimidation as long as it remained a 
credible threat. Thanks to its success in hiring exe-
cutioners, the domain was able, in a decree of 1860, 
to use death as a deterrent against subjects who 
were “so lawless that they disturbed the politics of 
the government (on-seijisuji).”13   
 
Mobilization by Status: The Wider Context 
 
In the nineteenth century, first-time employ-
ments of outcastes as executioners may have been 
rare, but there was a broader trend of mobilizing 
outcastes for new duties more generally. From 
around the middle of the eighteenth century, beggar 
(hinin) associations began to take on new roles par-
ticularly in the field of criminal investigation and 
town patrols. In Osaka, for example, the authorities 
started to employ the local hinin guilds for a variety 
of patrolling and policing tasks. In Kyoto, too, the 
shogunal government intensified its reliance on 
hinin policemen during roughly the same period.14  
The beggar guild of Ōno did not remain unaf-
                                                  
12  Although officials had complained about 
rising criminality in the eighteenth century as well, 
the town elders’ journals from the mid-eighteenth to 
the mid-nineteenth century indicate that the number 
of burglaries rose sharply in the 1830s and remained 
relatively high even after the Tenpō famine. Many 
of the thieves arrested and interrogated were 
unregistered mushuku born in the region who stole 
on a habitual basis. See also Ōno-shi shi, Yōdome-
hen, no. 999, pp. 732-734. 
13 Ōno-shi shi, Yōdome-hen, no. 1152, p. 823f. 
14  Asao Naohiro, “Hiden’in to Ōmi no 
hininban,” in Nihon kokka no shiteki tokushitsu. 
Kinsei/Kindai, ed. Asao Naohiro Kyōju Taikan Ki-
nenkai (Kyoto: Shibunkaku Shuppan, 1995), pp. 3-
36; Tsukada Takashi, Toshi Osaka to hinin (Tokyo: 
Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2001), pp. 34-65, 119-125. 
Edo’s beggars, by contrast, were never used as a 
city-wide police force. 
fected by this development. In the 1740s the beg-
gars of Ōno already contributed to public security as 
patrols and guards, but their responsibility was still 
for the most part limited to keeping the castle town 
and surroundings free of suspicious mendicants. In 
the decades that followed, however, they began to 
be employed for criminal investigations (tazun-
emono) on a broader scale to cope with a gradual 
rise in vagrancy and crime. By the 1830s, finally, 
they had turned into a busy police force that investi-
gated under the direction of the domain’s criminal 
bureau (tōzokukata) and hunted criminals in col-
laboration with colleagues of other domains in 
Echizen province.15 
Although new duties such as these increased the 
hinin’s labor burden, they also came with certain 
benefits. The outcastes tended to prefer police work 
over their other duties because it allowed them to 
exercise authority in the government’s name, and 
because it was also practiced by more respected 
groups such as commoners and low-ranking samurai. 
Moreover, when administrations imposed new tasks 
on the hinin they typically rewarded them with 
privileges for their cooperation. Such privileges 
often worked towards raising the outcastes’ social 
prestige, and could be combined with material bene-
fits. In Ōno, for example, in 1789, the hinin were 
granted the right to wear short swords when going 
on searches with outcaste colleagues from other 
domains,16 and also received a small rice stipend 
for running a new type of undercover town patrol.17   
The tendency to mobilize outcastes for new 
                                                  
15 A comparison between the town elders’ jour-
nals of the 1740s and those of the 1830s graphically 
illustrates the guild’s transformation from a simple 
beggar patrol into an experienced police force. See, 
for example, MT goyōdome 1740, 1741. Saitō Su-
zuko-ke monjo i030 026, i030 027; 1834, 1836, 
1837, 1838, 1840, 1841. Ibid. i030 051, i030 052, 
i030 053, i030 054, i030 056, i030 057. On the po-
licing functions of outcastes see also Ooms, pp. 
257-261; Christian M. Hermansen, “The Hinin As-
sociations in Osaka, 1600-1868,” The Copenhagen 
Journal of Asian Studies 15 (2001), pp. 47-80; 
Timothy Amos, “Portrait of a Tokugawa Outcaste 
Community,” East Asian History 32/33 (2006/7), pp. 
93-97. 
16 Ōno-shi shi, Yōdome-hen, no. 377, pp. 276f. 
17 Ibid., no. 376, p. 276. 
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tasks of public administration seamlessly continued 
into the era of Bakumatsu reforms. It even intensi-
fied as many domain governments were looking for 
ways to strengthen their territories both militarily 
and economically. In order to succeed in their re-
form projects, rulers needed to secure the active 
cooperation of at least a part of their subject popula-
tion. One way of doing so was to appeal to the sub-
jects’ sense of duty towards their lord, but there was 
an even more effective strategy: giving people a 
direct stake in particular reform measures through 
the conferral of rights, responsibilities, and titles. 
For example, the initiative of local artisans and 
merchants was essential to the success of Ōno do-
main’s mercantilist program (kokueki shihō), which 
involved import controls and the promotion and 
improvement of domestic production. Like other 
nearby domains in the nineteenth century, Ōno 
granted protection and monopoly rights to individu-
als and guilds who launched new enterprises to 
profit from the reforms and to contribute to them in 
return.18  At its colony on Karafuto, Ōno’s domain 
government entrusted the entire operation of the 
fishery and control of the local Ainu population to 
an experienced guard from an Ezo fishery, granting 
him a share of the profits and the right to wear a 
surname.19  Ōno domain also gave stipends and 
privileges to local blacksmiths who had mastered 
                                                  
18 Ōno-shi shi, Yōdome-hen, no. 649, 651, 652, 
654-659, pp. 462-481; Fukui-ken shi, Tsūshi-hen 4, 
Kinsei 2 (Fukui-ken, 1996), pp. 813-817. 
For example in neighboring Katsuyama; Ka-
tsuyama-shi shi, vol. 2, Genshi-Kinsei (Katsuyama: 
Katsuyama-shi, 2006), pp. 731-738. In nearby Fu-
kui, the domain’s promotion of local industries after 
the late 1850s led to a flurry of activity by guilds of 
overland textile traders, who cooperated with the 
domain’s new bureau of trade and production and 
had their trade monopoly protected in return; see 
Fukui-shi, ed., Fukui-shi shi, Tsūshi-hen 2, Kinsei 
(Fukui: Fukui-shi, 2008), pp. 904-941. For a discus-
sion of this trend in the Kantō region in the Baku-
matsu and early Meiji period see Matsuzawa 
Yūsaku, Meiji chihō jichitaisei no kigen, (Tokyo 
Daigaku Shuppankai, 2009), pp. 209-233. 
19  Azuma Shunsuke, “Bakumatsu-ki Kita 
Ezochi ni okeru Ōno-han no Ushoro basho keiei,” 
Hokkaidō kaitaku kinenkan kenkyū kiyō 35 (2007), 
pp. 78f. 
the art of gun-making.20 It bestowed rewards, such 
as the right to wear swords, on town merchants for 
their efforts in funding a new vaccination clinic 
(shutōkan), and on local doctors for their help with 
the domain-wide vaccination program. 21  While 
such privileging in itself was hardly new, it shows 
that Ōno’s domain government actively resorted to 
this time-tested method to engage particular indi-
viduals and groups of subjects in some of its most 
innovative reform ventures. 
Ōno’s employment of outcastes as executioners 
can thus be seen both as part of a longer trend to 
rely on outcastes for public security, and as a prod-
uct of the specific circumstances of the Bakumatsu 
era which made it more imperative than ever for 
domains to effectively utilize their human resources. 
The most ambitious, albeit unrealized, attempt to 
mobilize outcastes for the purpose of territorial 
strengthening was a group of proposals in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth century to send outcastes 
as settlers to the island of Ezo in order to preempt 
Russian colonial ambitions. The Shogunate seri-
ously considered the implementation of some of 
these projects, which usually involved the elevation 
of the new settlers to commoner status. After the 
Meiji Restoration, the idea of using outcastes for 
colonial ends had an interesting afterlife. Although 
the residents of former outcaste communities could 
no longer be mobilized through the unit of the status 
group, the authors of such plans saw emigration as 
an ideal way to reconcile economic aid and freedom 
from discrimination for outcastes with the need to 
give these “deviant” and “uncivilized” citizens a 
role in the Japanese national project (and rid local 
communities of their presence).22 
By offering status privileges and material bene-
fits to outcastes, Tokugawa governments skillfully 
                                                  
20  In 1856, four blacksmiths, as well as a 
carpenter who had learned how to construct gun 
batteries, received stipends, and in one case also the 
right to wear swords; Ōno-shi shi, Yōdome-hen, no. 
1092, p. 792. 
21 According to entries in the town elders’ jour-
nals of 1860 and 1861; Ōno-shi shi, Yōdome-hen, 
no. 1146, pp. 820f., no. 1173, pp. 839f.; no. 1243, p. 
879. 
22 Noah McCormack, “Buraku Emigration in 
the Meiji Era – Other Ways to Become ‘Japanese’,” 
East Asian History 23 (2002), pp. 87-108.. 
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exploited these groups’ deep-rooted desire to escape 
their reviled status. In the late eighteenth and nine-
teenth century the discriminatory treatment of out-
castes, as well as their resistance against it, appeared 
to reach a new level of intensity.23 In 1843 and 
1856, for example, Japan witnessed major incidents 
of outcaste unrest,24 and tracts such as Senjū Fu-
jiatsu’s Eta o osamuru gi (before 1864) expressed 
an anxiety among government elites that outcastes 
might eventually rise up in discontent if treated as 
inferior and forced to undertake lowly lines of 
work.25 But alongside such violent outbursts, many 
outcaste groups also engaged in a less spectacular 
and largely peaceful struggle to obtain new privi-
leges or to protest against the imposition of new 
discriminatory restrictions.26  
The developments described above constitute 
the wider context for the events taken up in this pa-
per. While outcastes strove to better their position, 
governments looked for ways to mobilize their sub-
jects for their policy goals. The hiring of execution-
ers in Ōno, however, presents an especially intrigu-
ing case because it confronted the outcastes with a 
dilemma. Executions differed from police work in 
that they involved the taking of life, and thus threat-
ened to reinforce the very stigmatization that the 
outcastes were hoping to overcome. Hence, the out-
castes’ drive to improve their social standing and the 
domain’s desire to mobilize their labor were not 
easily reconciled. 
Ōno’s case is also interesting because it reminds 
us that outcastes were not a monolithic category and 
did not jointly seek to escape from a uniform state 
of discrimination. As the following discussion will 
show, there were various groups of outcastes in and 
around the domain who suffered from different de-
                                                  
23 See, for example, Amos, pp. 97-108. 
24 Ooms, pp. 243-311; 
25 Guido Woldering, “Eta wo osamuru no gi 
oder ‘Erörterung der Herrschaft über die 
Schmutzigen.’ Gedanken eines Schwertadligen der 
späten Edo-Zeit zum ‘Abschaum’ seiner Gesell-
schaft,” NOAG 171-172 (2002), pp. 21-37. See also 
Tejima Kazuo, “Kiheitai ni okeru ‘eta’ gunji tōyō no 
igi – Takasugi Shinsaku no kyōheiron,” Buraku 
mondai kenkyū 111 (1991/5), pp. 72-74. 
26  Such petitions often employed quite 
sophisticated reasoning; see Ooms, pp. 264-270; 
Ōno-shi shi, Yōdome-hen, no. 599, pp. 422f. 
grees of stigma, and who understood their own posi-
tion relative to that of other groups in their immedi-
ate or extended neighborhood. In their negotiations 
with outcastes, Ōno’s domain officials needed to be 
mindful of these relative distinctions, and of the 
stigmatizing effects of different kinds of duty work, 
which were often beyond the government’s control.  
 
The Search for Reliable Executioners 
 
Let us now turn to the settlement of 1852 to dis-
cuss the circumstances of the employment of out-
castes as both executioners and as execution assis-
tants. The domain government was eager to eradi-
cate crime, but felt that this could not be achieved 
without finding a reliable person to carry out the 
death penalty. As it turned out, the man who served 
as Ōno’s jail guard in the 1830s was completely 
unsuited to the task. In 1838 the town elder, the 
highest-ranking official among the townspeople, 
noted the following exchange:27 
 
Fifth month, ninth day: 
A town corps messenger arrived from Yo-
kota-sama [the town magistrate, or machi bu-
gyō], and when I reported right away the 
magistrate told me: “We need to talk about 
the jail guard. He abhors doing executions, 
and feigns illness, helps convicts commit sui-
cide, and more. I am therefore considering 
replacing him, but because there is no one 
else to do it, I had no choice but to set the 
matter aside. Now I want you to ask whether 
there is someone among the Koshirō who 
would do it if we gave him a certain amount 
in reward for each person executed.” I replied 
that I believed that the Koshirō, too, were 
cowards altogether and would not do this, but 
that I would pass the magistrate’s suggestion 
on to them.  
[…] 
Fifth month, eleventh day:  
I reported to the town magistrate that 
when I asked the Koshirō about the issue of 
the death convicts, they replied that no matter 
how much the authorities bestowed on them, 
all of them would, regrettably, be unable to 
serve in this capacity.  
                                                  
27 Ōno-shi shi, Yōdome-hen, no. 773, p. 553. 
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Was the jail guard’s reluctance to conduct exe-
cutions indicative of a larger trend critical of the 
death penalty? Throughout the Tokugawa period, 
society had certainly exhibited strong reservations 
toward capital punishment, or at least its excessive 
application, which ran counter to the government’s 
promise of benevolent rule.28 But at least until the 
1830s, the domain officials of Ōno seem to have 
had no major problems finding commoners who 
were willing to fill the position of jail guard.  
In 1838, as the above source shows, the town 
magistrate approached a group called the Koshirō 
with a proposal to hire one of its members for the 
newly created job of executioner.29 The Koshirō 
were a guild of professional beggars considered to 
be of hinin status. Until this point, the Koshirō 
community had been serving the domain in various 
public functions, for example as guards and police-
men, managers of the local beggar hospice, torturers, 
and subordinate jail guards. As outcastes with ex-
perience in handling criminals, they seemed a con-
venient choice. But when the domain made its offer, 
the beggars refused categorically. The Koshirō had 
always been wary of duties that involved the taking 
of life because they wanted to avoid being confused 
with the kawaya, outcastes who engaged in the 
manufacture of leather. Twice, for example, they 
had (unsuccessfully) tried to resist domain orders to 
help kill stray dogs during rabies epidemics by argu-
ing that the kawaya were the more appropriate 
group for this kind of undertaking.30  
                                                  
28 Botsman, pp. 41-58, 89-97. In 1792, a town 
doctor of Ōno successfully pleaded to have the life 
of a burglar who had broken into his house spared, 
arguing that to see the man executed would contra-
dict his professional mission of saving human life; 
Ōno-shi shi, Yōdome-hen, no. 412, p. 291. 
29 Ōno-shi shi, Yōdome-hen, no. 773, p. 553.  
30 In 1776 and 1815. In the 1815 case, the 
Koshirō openly voiced their concerns about the 
stigma they expected to face if mistaken for kawaya 
(here derogatorily referred to as eta), and remained 
unpersuaded by the town elders’ counter-argument 
that the kawaya only skinned animals and did not 
kill them. However, they were forced to comply 
after the domain officials located old records that 
proved that the Koshirō had been asked to kill dogs 
in the past. See Ōno-shi shi, Yōdome-hen, no. 97, 
pp. 85f; no. 599, pp. 422f. 
 There was a small community of kawaya in the 
domain, and one would indeed expect them to have 
qualified as candidates for the executioner assign-
ment. After all, in most places outcastes who par-
ticipated in executions were drawn not from people 
of hinin but of kawaya background. But it is unclear 
whether the domain officials considered asking 
them or not. They did, however, send a messenger 
to the nearby castle town of Fukui to advertise the 
job among the local outcaste-executioners, appar-
ently to no avail.31 
In 1852, more than a decade later, the Koshirō 
finally gave up their resistance and agreed to carry 
out death sentences, which normally involved de-
capitation (kubikiri goyō) as practiced in Ōno.32 
They did so after lengthy negotiations with Yoshi-
kawa Magodayū, an officer of the domain’s criminal 
bureau (tōzokukata). As the town magistrate ex-
plained to the town elders:  
 
“Actually, this is the only place that 
makes the jail guard do decapitations. For this 
reason it happens that major criminals who 
ought to be executed escape from who knows 
where, as we just experienced the other day. 
The Koshirō do not like [to do beheadings] 
either, but step by step we conducted confi-
dential negotiations with them through Yoshi-
kawa Magodayū of the criminal bureau (tōzo-
kukata), and barely persuaded them to agree 
by granting them the three paragraphs.” 
 
Obviously, the Koshirō needed to be compen-
sated for their cooperation. Part of that compensa-
tion came in material form (six bales of rice per 
year), but what the Koshirō were far more interested 
                                                  
31 “Machidoshiyori goyōdome,” 1838 5/15, 6/6, 
Saitō Suzuko-ke monjo i030 054, pp. 115, 135. The 
group contacted in Fukui were the so-called 
Seiganji-mono, a community of actors and teahouse 
operators who were in charge of commoner be-
headings; see “Kujikata osadamegaki,” 1778, 
Matsudaira bunko 640, in Fukui-shi shi, Shiryō-hen 
6, Kinsei 4-1 (Fukui-shi, 1997), pp. 711-753; 
“Seiganji to gekijō no yurai,” Fukui shinbun (May 
17, 1913) (repr. in Mori Tsunenori, Fukui-han 
shiwa, vol. 1, Rekishi toshosha, 1975, pp. 42f.). 
32 Ōno-shi shi, Yōdome-hen, no. 999, pp. 732-
734. 
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in were the so-called “three paragraphs”: a) the ap-
pointment of the three executioners as informers 
(meakashi, see below), b) permission to carry a 
short sword while on duty as informer within Ōno 
domain, c) permission to enter the premises of 
commoner houses up until the threshold while on 
duty as informer. The Koshirō themselves con-
firmed that the informer appointment had been the 
only reason for their compliance, and they success-
fully protested against a draft of the acceptance let-
ter that called their nomination “temporary” (tō-
bun).33  
In many places in early modern Japan, particu-
larly in the east, meakashi was used as a term for 
gangsters who cooperated in the arrest of criminals. 
In the eyes of the Koshirō, the meakashi designation 
was a status marker. For many decades, they had 
been engaging in the same kind of police work as 
the informers of eastern Japan, and because the lat-
ter enjoyed commoner status, the new title carried 
the promise of upgrading the Koshirō’s position and 
helping them offset the stigma attached to the exe-
cutioner job.34 In 1782, Ōno’s neighbor domain 
Katsuyama had also hired its local hinin bosses as 
executioners by appointing them as informers.35 
Most likely the officials and the hinin of Ōno were 
imitating this example, a convergence that was typi-
cal for regions with many small interlocking do-
mains.36  
The town officials (the town elders and 
neighborhood headmen) were notified of the new 
appointments only after the negotiations were over, 
                                                  
33“Machidoshiyori goyōdome,” 1852 6/1. Saitō 
Suzuko-ke monjo i030 063, p. 90. 
34 Tsukada, “Kinsei no keibatsu,” pp. 105-116. 
35 Matsumura monjo 9, 1782; Matsui monjo 
677-13, 1782. Copies of these documents can be 
accessed in the Office for the Compilation of 
Katsuyama City History (Katsuyama-shi Shi 
Hensanshitsu). 
36 See, for example, the case of small domains 
in rural Harima in the late Tokugawa period: Ku-
sayama Iwao, “Sonraku keisatsu-ri hininban ni 
tsuite (1) (2) – Ōsaka shikasho to Setsu/Ban 
ryōgoku murakata no kinchō kankei o jiku to shite –
 ,” Chiikishi kenkyū 19/3 (1990), pp. 1-33; 20/1 
(1990), pp. 1-25. 
but they reacted to them with fierce opposition.37 
Their main concern was that the Koshirō would in-
fringe on their own privileges, for example by wear-
ing short swords when lower-ranking townspeople 
were not allowed to do so. But the town officials 
were also able to bolster their case with a more 
practical argument: they pointed out that openly 
turning the Koshirō into informers could in fact be 
counterproductive to the goal of improving public 
security. After all, meakashi were effective as in-
formants precisely because of their connections to 
the world of outlaws, and the town elders were 
aware of a number of recent cases in which the Ko-
shirō had given shelter to dangerous gangsters.  
While the domain officials did not deny this 
problem, they seem to have believed that the bene-
fits of having reliable executioners outweighed the 
dangers of having unreliable policemen, especially 
since the Koshirō had been active as de facto in-
formers for quite a long time. The town magistrate 
carefully listened to the town elders’ concerns but 
overrode them in the end.  A few months later, the 
three men who had volunteered - Jin’emon, Jinbei, 
and San’emon - were given their first assignment: 
beheading three notorious thieves who had been 
caught over the preceding year.38  
Perhaps the townspeople’s case would have 
been more persuasive if they had been able to sug-
gest an alternative candidate for the position of exe-
cutioner. The domain officials, too, could have eas-
ily solved the dilemma by appointing a member of 
their own retainer band, but for reasons that remain 
obscure, they must have found it inappropriate to do 
so. The retainer band of the Doi house of Ōno is 
known to have been unusually small in relation to 
domain size. 39  As executions were not a time-
consuming task, the domain leadership should tech-
nically have been able to nominate a candidate, es-
pecially as samurai were often put in charge of be-
headings elsewhere. But it is possible that the lord 
was reluctant to risk the reputation of one of his 
retainers by making him engage in a potentially 
                                                  
37 Ōno-shi shi, Yōdome-hen, no. 999, pp. 732-
734. 
38  “Machidoshiyori goyōdome,” 1852 12/18. 
Saitō Suzuko-ke monjo i030 063, p. 167. 
39 Funazawa Shigeki, “Ōno-han kashindan no 
shokusei to kyūroku,” Fukui-ken shi kenkyū 9 
(1991), pp. 53-74. 
EARLY MODERN JAPAN                                2010 
 
83 
stigmatizing activity. Many of the hereditary vassals 
had to be promoted to various positions over the 
course of their careers to maintain a workable ad-
ministration. It is also worth noting that none among 
Ōno’s immediate neighbor domains employed he-
reditary samurai for decapitations.  
Why was the executioner assignment limited to 
three of the beggar bosses and not extended to the 
entire group, which numbered at least five members 
at the time? Conversely, one might wonder why the 
job was not given to a single outcaste individual. 
This question is important because it forces us to 
think about whether the executioner employment 
was really an issue that affected the Koshirō as a 
group. Unfortunately, the town elders’ journals, the 
only sources containing information on the case, are 
silent on this point. There is also very little evidence 
on the internal order of the Koshirō guild in general. 
It is clear, though, that the group did not have a sin-
gle leader, but consisted of a small and fluctuating 
number (four to eight) of full members who were 
allowed to form hereditary households. This does 
not necessarily mean that there were no hierarchical 
distinctions, but none of these members ever took 
the lead in dealing with the town elders, not even on 
a rotating basis.  
There is, however, room for some speculation. 
Perhaps some of the household heads were unsuit-
able because of physical weakness or age. Or the 
authorities may have wanted to appoint a specific 
individual to avoid ambiguity, whereas the Koshirō 
preferred a higher number of appointees in order to 
spread the burden, extract higher compensations, or 
give more members the chance to take the title of 
meakashi.40 In their negotiations with the domain 
officials over the executioner question, the Koshirō 
                                                  
40 The matter is further complicated by the fact 
that a journal entry from the following year (1853) 
mentions a set of names for the executioners ap-
pointed in 1852 that differs from that of the initial 
appointment letter: Jinzaemon, Jinbei, and Chō-
emon; see “Machidoshiyori goyōdome,” 1853, 5/21, 
Adachi Hiromichi-ke monjo i139 004, p. 12. While 
the switch from “Jin’emon” to “Jinzaemon” could 
be an orthographic mistake or a result of the town 
elder’s eccentric handwriting, it is less easy to ex-
plain the substitution of “Chōemon” for “San’-
emon.” All four also appear as names of established 
Koshirō households in other sources. 
always acted as a guild and bargained collectively. 
But it is still noteworthy that the authorities con-
ferred this duty on particular members, and not on 
the entire group as was the case with most of the 
beggar bosses’ other official obligations. 
 
Kanazuka Village and the Duty of Penal Assis-
tance 
 
Thanks to the Koshirō’s cooperation, the domain 
was now able to crack down on criminals with a 
heavier hand. But before any executions could actu-
ally be carried out, another problem needed to be 
resolved: the question of who would serve as penal 
assistant (gōmon ninsoku). Penal assistants were 
responsible for removing the bodies of executed 
criminals. 41  Traditionally, these auxiliaries, of 
whom there were four, had been supplied by a 
group of cormorant fishermen and bird catchers 
from the village of Kanazuka. In the late sixteenth 
century the Kanazuka villagers had been privileged 
as a hunting community by the early lords of Ōno.42 
In addition to the duty of supplying execution assis-
tants, they paid a bird tax and a fish tax and also 
delivered catches of sweetfish (ayu) to the domain, 
which were then offered as gifts to the Shogunate.43  
The Kanazuka villagers intermarried with com-
moners, meaning that they did not face the same 
degree of discrimination as the beggars. In fact, 
there is no evidence aside from vague rumors that 
they were somehow excluded from the society of 
commoners. But there were other settlements of 
cormorant fishermen in Tokugawa Japan that were 
subject to customary forms of discrimination, and 
the Kanazuka people, too, may have faced a latent 
                                                  
41  “Machidoshiyori goyōdome,” 1841 5/21, 
Saitō Suzuko-ke monjo i030 057, p. 103f.; 1852 6/4, 
ibid. i030 063, p. 9. 
42  Tenmangū monjo, in Ōno-shi Shi Hensan 
Iinkai, ed., Ōno-shi shi, vol. 1, Shaji monjo-hen 
(Ōno: Ōno Shiyakusho, 1978), no.  37/1-37/8, pp. 
493-495; Ōno-shi shi, vol. 13, Minzoku-hen (Ōno: 
Ōno Shiyakusho, 2008), pp. 203f. 
43  “Tsutomekata oboegaki Tamura-hikae,” 
precedents on seasonal gifts (toki no kenjō); and 
Ōno-shi shi, Yōdome-hen, no. 913, p. 676. 
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danger of falling into disrepute.44 During the me-
dieval period cormorant fishermen, and many other 
types of fishermen and hunters, had been part of a 
wider circle of base people whose livelihood 
breached Buddhist commandments against the tak-
ing of life.45 The belief that hunting and fishing 
were sinful pursuits gave rise to discrimination in 
everyday life that persisted into the Tokugawa era, 
albeit in weakened form. Remainders of this medie-
val legacy can be seen, for example, in the hunting 
and fishing bans that were imposed on villages such 
as Kanazuka when a member of the imperial or 
shogunal family passed away and the country was in 
a state of mourning.46 
At some point before 1841, the Koshirō had 
started to fill in for Kanazuka as execution assistants 
in return for a yearly fee. This was a temporary 
agreement, and the fishermen needed to renew it 
from time to time. Most likely they had entered into 
this compact to rid themselves of a stigmatized duty. 
But in 1841, around the end of the Tenpō famine, 
the villagers of Kanazuka made a petition to the 
domain government stating that they were too im-
poverished to pay the fee to the beggars any longer 
                                                  
44 Okiura Kazuteru, Nihon minshū bunka no 
genkyō. Hisabetsu buraku no minzoku to geinō 
(Osaka: Kaihō Shuppansha, 1984), pp. 239-308. 
45 Taira Masayuki, “Sesshō kindan to sesshō 
zaigōkan,” in Shūen bunka to mibunsei, ed. Wakita 
Haruko, Martin Collcutt, Taira Masayuki (Kyōto: 
Shibunkaku Shuppan, 2005), pp. 240-268. 
46  For example “Machidoshiyori goyōdome,” 
1741 3/8, Saitō Suzuko-ke monjo i030 027, p. 20; 
1841 2/7, Ibid. i030 057, p. 35. To be sure, orders 
such as these do not prove that the cormorant fish-
ermen and hunters themselves were considered as 
impure and were discriminated against in everyday 
life; other, more respected professions were also 
subjected to restrictions on such occasions. As Taira 
has pointed out, the rationales for hunting and fish-
ing bans at times of mourning changed over time, 
and were also informed by notions other than fear of 
pollution (e.g. the ideal of filial piety). On the sub-
ject of mourning regulations and the idea of pollu-
tion in the early modern period see Taira, pp. 246-
248, and Minegishi Kentarō, “Kegare kannen to 
buraku sabetsu, ge (part 2) – sono fukabunsei to 
kegare kannen no ichi,” Buraku mondai kenkyū 162 
(2002), pp. 97-119. 
and asking the domain to exempt them from the 
duty altogether.47 The authorities declined the re-
quest, but promised to temporarily pay the money in 
the villagers’ stead if the fishermen agreed to supply 
ayu fish to the lord free of charge. In other words, 
the domain began to pay money to the Koshirō to 
release the Kanazuka people from a duty that the 
domain itself had been imposing on them in the first 
place. 
In 1852, the contract between Kanazuka and the 
Koshirō came to the domain’s attention once 
again.48 As the town elders’ journal tells us, this 
was because the agreement had expired and needed 
to be renegotiated, but obviously it was also because 
in that year the Koshirō had finally accepted the job 
of executioner, making it necessary to settle the as-
sistant question as well. Although the Koshirō were 
not eager to continue substituting for Kanazuka, 
they again tried to sell their cooperation for the 
highest possible price.  
Yet Kanazuka was a poor village and unable to 
make an offer that was sufficiently attractive to the 
Koshirō. Fearful they would have to serve as execu-
tion assistants again, the Kanazuka villagers turned 
to the domain government for help. The officials 
promised to cooperate and make an offer to the Ko-
shirō in their stead. Why is unclear, but there must 
have been a very good reason for the domain to help 
Kanazuka; perhaps the domain wanted to prevent 
the village from further impoverishing itself, or 
there may have been concerns about having people 
who supplied fish for the Shogunate engaging in a 
polluting activity.49 
The Koshirō were now in a position to negotiate 
directly with the domain government, and they used 
this opportunity to request a privilege they had been 
craving for a long time: an extension of their beg-
                                                  
47  “Machidoshiyori goyōdome,” 1841 5/21, 
Saitō Suzuko-ke monjo i030 057, pp. 103f. 
48  Ibid., 1852 intercal. 2/16+21+26, 4/21, 
6/1+4+21, Saitō Suzuko-ke monjo i030 063, pp. 34f., 
40f., 47, 72, 87, 91f., 101f. 
49 One of the documents produced by domain 
officials on this case circumscribes the job of penal 
assistants as “handling polluted people” (kegare no 
mono toriatsukai), but it remains unclear whether 
concern with pollution was a decisive factor here; 
“Machidoshiyori goyōdome,” 1841 5/21, Saitō 
Suzuko-ke monjo i030 057, pp. 103f. 
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ging territory. There were a number of remote vil-
lages in the domain that did not give alms to the 
Koshirō but had customary relations with other out-
castes. The Koshirō had been trying to bring these 
villages and their outcaste village guards under their 
influence, and they perceived the 1852 negotiations 
as a chance to persuade the government to back up 
their demands.50  The domain officials, eager as 
they were to finally conduct executions, complied 
with this request. 
Promising the Koshirō access to the outlying 
villages was one thing; but in reality, the domain did 
not have the authority to make good on this promise. 
Although the villages in question all belonged to 
Ōno’s territory and the domain leadership was 
strong, the officials were unwilling, and ultimately 
unable, to force these communities to give up their 
traditional relationships with other outcastes. 51 
Nevertheless, there was a way of working around 
the problem: the domain offered to pay the Koshirō 
the sum of 2.04 koku (97.2 gallons, or 368 liters) of 
rice every year, which corresponded to the amount 
of alms the guild would theoretically have collected 
from these villages had they been allowed access to 
them. From 1852 onwards, the domain continued to 
                                                  
50  “Doi Noto no kami yōdome-chō,” Kitano 
Sōbei-ke monjo no. 41, in Ota-chō shi, Shiryō-hen 2 
(Ota-chō, 1996), p. 356; “Bannin sashidashi-jō,” 
ibid. no. 2, p. 273; “Machidoshiyori goyōdome,” 
1837 8/25, Saitō Suzuko-ke monjo i030 057, p. 208. 
According to these sources, the villages in Nishikata 
(Niu district) were the territory of San’emon, the 
guard of Ota village (Ōno domain). Although the 
Koshirō succeeded in bringing San’emon under 
their control in or before 1817, the watchman seems 
to have committed himself to little more than a 
yearly payment of eight monme of silver, and made 
an attempt in the 1830s to withdraw from their in-
fluence once again. So far, I have not been able to 
locate information on the affiliation of village 
guards in the valleys of Anama and Nishitani (the 
second region that was not included in the Koshirō’s 
begging territory). 
51 The town magistrate argued that the domain 
could not intervene because the villages in question 
were already employing other outcastes as guards 
(banta); see “Machidoshiyori goyōdome,” 1852 
intercal. 2/16, Saitō Suzuko-ke monjo i030 063, pp. 
34f. 
pay these substitute alms to the Koshirō every year 
for their willingness to fill in as execution assistants 
for Kanazuka.52 And the Koshirō made sure that the 
agreement remained temporary: that is, it would be 
up for renegotiation every ten years.53 Most likely, 
they were hoping to retract or sell their cooperation 
at an even higher price on future occasions. 
Despite all of these incentives, the Koshirō seem 
to have been uncomfortable with their new role. 
Less than a year after the nominations, in 1853, they 
requested that the domain cancel the arrangement 
and allow their three members to resign from the 
position of executioner-informer. 54   But it was 
already too late: once the Koshirō had accepted the 
deal, the tables had turned, and the domain was not 
inclined to let them get away again easily. The guild 
thus continued to supply both executioners and 
assistants until an unknown point in the early Meiji 
period. 55  It is impossible to know how many 
persons the Koshirō ended up executing between 
                                                  
52  “Machidoshiyori goyōdome,” 1855 12/16, 
Saitō Suzuko-ke monjo i030 064, p. 89; 1856 12/16, 
Adachi Hiromichi-ke monjo i139 005, p. 147; 1860 
7/11, Saitō Suzuko-ke monjo i030 065, p. 90; 1865 
1/11, ibid. i030 068, p. 4. Both substitute alms and 
executioner allowances were due at the end of the 
year, but in 1853 the Koshirō began to receive half 
of them as advance loans around the time of obon in 
the seventh month; see “Machidoshiyori goyō-
dome,” 1853 7/13, Adachi Hiromichi-ke monjo i139 
004, p. 33. 
53  The Koshirō also insisted on having the 
Kanazuka villagers confirm the deal by exchanging 
a written guarantee with them, a condition the 
fishermen were reluctant to accept and only fulfilled 
after being pressured to do so by the town elders; 
see, for example, “Machidoshiyori goyōdome,” 
1852, 6/4, Saitō Suzuko-ke monjo i030 063, p. 91 
54  “Machidoshiyori goyōdome,” 1853 5/21, 
Adachi Hiromichi-ke monjo i139 004, p. 12. The 
entry does not give the reason for their petition. 
55 In 1871, the former territory of Ōno domain 
became part of Fukui, and later Asuwa, Tsuruga, 
and Ishikawa prefectures. From 1871 onwards exe-
cutions were conducted in Fukui, for example in the 
aftermath of a large uprising in Ōno and its 
surroundings in 1873. See Sakata Tamako, Echizen 
Ōno ikki (Fukui-ken Ōno-shi Kyōiku Iinkai, 1972), 
pp. 91, 149. 
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1852 and the early years of Meiji, but a reasonable 
guess might put the number at an average of one or 




When the Tokugawa period ended, outcastes 
were serving as executioners in Ōno, but there was 
nothing self-evident or traditional about this ar-
rangement. For most of the early modern period, the 
Koshirō guild did not have anything at all to do with 
capital punishment, and it was only during the re-
form years of the Bakumatsu era that the domain 
decided to hire members of the local beggar organi-
zation for these purposes. The goal was to reestab-
lish the death penalty as an effective punishment, to 
eliminate crime, and to make the domain strong, 
prosperous, and ready for a new and modern age.  
But in their search for executioners, the domain 
officials confronted two groups of people who had 
very different ideas of their roles in Ōno’s future 
society. The Kanazuka villagers were trying to dis-
tance themselves from the outcastes, and the Ko-
shirō were striving to reinvent themselves as a kind 
of domain police. If the domain wanted these people, 
or any of its other subjects, to cooperate with its 
reforms, it needed to take their concerns with status 
(compounded in this case by the problem of impu-
rity) seriously. Even a strong and innovative gov-
ernment such as Ōno’s did not have the power to 
completely override the carefully balanced system 
of precedent and privilege that was so characteristic 
of the status order, and that gave its subjects a voice 
and leverage vis-à-vis the government. The result 
was a string of highly convoluted and makeshift 
agreements. 
Seen from this angle, rule by status seems to 
have been a serious obstacle to the domain’s 
achievement of meaningful reform. But one should 
not overlook that in the end, the domain did succeed 
in motivating people to accept a job that, at this time 
and place, appears to have been extremely stigma-
tized. Money alone could not have achieved this: it 
seems rather unlikely, given social aversion to the 
position, that the domain would have found a candi-
date simply by relying on the local labor market. In 
the absence of, for example, a national ideology or 
the promise of political representation to mobilize 
its subjects for its goals, it seems natural that the 
domain should have relied on the time-tested 
mechanism of imposing duties in return for privi-
leges. From temporary agreements and the conferral 
of titles to alms substitutions and free sweetfish of-
ferings, the system offered the government a con-
siderable degree of leeway to pursue its own goals 
while satisfying the various, and often conflicting, 
interests of the status groups within its borders. For 
Ōno domain, the most productive way to conduct 
reform was not to work against the status order, but 
to work with it, by applying its rules in a creative 
way. The executioner case thus underlines what 
Daniel Botsman has pointed out in his discussion of 
the prison in nineteenth-century Japan: that seem-
ingly modern developments in the late Tokugawa 
period cannot be understood without considering 
them in the context of the status order.56 
How did Ōno’s case relate to the way the Sho-
gunate in Edo dealt with status in the final decades 
of the Tokugawa period? On the one hand, the Sho-
gunate made a famous attempt during the Tenpō 
Reforms (1841-43) to remedy some of the com-
plexities and inefficiencies of the status system by 
improving registration procedures for residents of 
the shogunal capital, and by resettling parts of Edo’s 
population to reestablish unity between status and 
place of residence. On the other hand, these reforms 
did not keep the Shogunate from mobilizing and 
controlling social groups through the conferral of 
status privileges, thus continuing the very practice 
that had been responsible for complicating the sys-
tem in the first place. The culmination of this devel-
opment can be seen in 1868, when the failing Toku-
gawa house elevated Danzaemon, the outcaste boss 
of Edo, to commoner status in exchange for his 
military cooperation.  
This contradictory approach to status in the Ba-
kumatsu period was possible because, as Yokoyama 
Yuriko has argued, the Shogunate had begun to 
make a distinction between status as a system of 
registering and classifying the resident population, 
and status as a mode to mobilize and govern occu-
pational groups.57 Although these two aspects of 
                                                  
56 Botsman, pp. 85-114. 
57  Yokoyama Yuriko, “Meiji ishin to kinsei 
mibunsei no kaitai,” in Nihonshi kōza 7. Kinsei no 
kaitai, ed. Rekishigaku kenkyūkai, Nihonshi ken-
kyūkai (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2005), 
pp. 133-162; ibid., Meiji ishin to kinsei mibunsei no 
kaitai (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2005), pp. 
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status had initially tended to overlap, they became 
disjointed over time, and the resulting complexities 
made it increasingly difficult for the shogunal gov-
ernment to keep track of its subjects. When the 
Shogunate tried to reform the status order in the 
Bakumatsu era, however, it touched only upon the 
aspect of registration and classification, and contin-
ued to mobilize social groups through status privi-
leges in a way that was similar to what we have ob-
served for Ōno domain.  
The impasses of the old order and the innova-
tions of the new have been a topic of continuing 
interest among historians of nineteenth-century Ja-
pan, and for good reason. Yet, even in the Baku-
matsu period the abolition of the status order was by 
no means a foregone conclusion. It will be an im-
portant task to further explore the workings of this 
order in the last decades of shogunal rule, and to 
draw attention to both its potential and its limita-
tions.  
 
                                                                             
27-61. 
